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The goal of this paper is to assess, for the ﬁrst time, the empirical im-
pact of ”Keynes’ beauty contest”, or ”higher order beliefs”, on asset price
volatility. The paper shows that heterogeneous expectations induce higher
order beliefs and that asset pricing models with heterogeneous expectations
theoretically generate more volatility than rational expectation models. The
paper also explains how, with some assumptions on the distribution of public
and private information, a model with higher order beliefs can be empiri-
cally tested. The model is then applied to American stock market annual
data. The results show that a model with higher order beliefs generates a
level of volatility in line with the price volatility observed on the market.
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I nt h ep a s t2 5y e a r s ,ﬁnancial economists have spent a lot of time and atten-
tion in assessing the empirical validity of rational expectation asset pricing
models. The common hypothesis of these models is that stock prices should
reﬂect the present value of rationally expected future payoﬀs. Although the
rational expectation hypothesis constitutes the basis of most contemporary
asset pricing models, its empirical support is rather weak. The ﬁrst major
critics against such models came from Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter
(1981), who argued that the price volatility observed on the market is too
l a r g et ob ej u s t i ﬁed by rational expectation models. These two papers are
at the origin of numerous other articles, which have tried to explain this
excess volatility puzzle in the framework of rational expectations.
After some early technical improvements (see, e.g., Campbell and Schiller
1987 and 1988), research has concentrated on asset pricing models with
stochastic discount factors. The idea is to build an asset pricing model
with additional economic variables, which generate a time-varying discount
factor, and check if the additional variability brought by these new variables
can match the excess volatility.1 However, neither of these factors seems to
explain all of the excess volatility (Shiller 2003). Furthermore, recent studies,
which do not use the classical volatility test, have also found evidence against
rational expectations models (Zhong, Darrat and Anderson 2003).
Confronted with the apparent empirical failure of rational expectation
models, many researchers have argued that some “non-fundamental” factors
may be at the origin of price movements. Behavioral ﬁnance deals speciﬁ-
cally with such market “irregularities” and has put forward diﬀerent possible
explanations to the excess volatility puzzle.2 In particular, Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) propose a model with habit formation, which theoreti-
cally generates excess volatility through changes in risk aversion. Barberis,
1Many factors have been proposed as possible source of excess volatility. The most
common are consumption and expected inﬂation (see Wickens 2003 for a recent study
with these two variables). Other factors are, for example, tax rate changes, production
volatility changes or transaction costs changes.
2See Barberis and Thaler (2002) or Shiller (2003) for a survey of the answer that
behavioural ﬁnance gives to excess volatility in stock markets.
1Huang and Santos (2001) introduce loss aversion to explain the puzzle. Af-
ter calibration, both models replicate several distinctive features of the stock
markets, such has, in particular, the observed volatility.
This paper explores another potential “non-fundamental” factor, namely
the impact of ”Keynes’ beauty contest” on asset prices. The name of this
eﬀect comes from Keynes’ famous metaphor, in which he suggests that, in
order to form their demand for an asset, investors not only forecast the fu-
ture payoﬀs but also try to guess other market participants’ forecasts and
others’ forecasts of others’ forecasts, etc. (Keynes 1936). In this situation,
investors are said to have “higher order beliefs”. Townsend (1983), in a
general framework, and Basak (2000), in the context of stock markets, theo-
retically show that higher order beliefs induce a higher price volatility than
rational expectations do.3 This additional volatility is caused by the fact
that investors react to variations generated by decisions of others and to
the noise in such decisions. This phenomenon is called endogenous uncer-
tainty by Kurz (1974). Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2004) also show that
higher order beliefs can induce a disconnection between the price and its
fundamental value.
Even if the role of higher order beliefs in explaining the excess volatility
puzzle is theoretically acknowledged, no empirical estimation of their eﬀect
has been made yet. The aim this paper is to ﬁll this gap and to quantify
the empirical impact of Keynes’ beauty contest on stock price volatility. To
pursue this empirical goal, we contribute to the theoretical literature by
elaborating a Heterogeneous Expectation Asset Pricing Model (HEAPM)
with constant relative risk aversion, time-varying discount rate and a time-
varying risk premium (cf. Section 2.1).4 We then present a framework based
on public and private information about future dividend, which allows the
empirical estimation of the HEAPM (cf. Section 3). We explain how, in
3Miller (1977), Harrison and Kreps (1978), Morris (1996) or Wu and Guo (2004) also
show that higher order beliefs generate excess volatility, but they need to add the hypoth-
esis of limited short-selling to get this feature.
4Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2004) have independently derived a similar model but
with constant absolute risk aversion, constant discount rate and a constant risk premium.
Biais, Bossaerts and Spatt (2003) use a set-up similar to Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2004) for a one-period asset pricing model.
2this context, the HEAPM generates additional price volatility (cf. Section
3.4). We then estimate the HEAPM with American stock market data for
the period between 1871 and 2003. The main result of this paper is that the
volatility implied by the HEAPM seems to correspond to the one observed
on the market (cf. Sections 6 and 7). In that sense, higher order beliefs
might be a plausible explanation to the excess volatility puzzle. We ﬁnally
present some additional empirical results on how the investors incorporate
public and private information into their expectations.
2 The heterogeneous expectation asset pricing model
2.1 The average asset demand
As suggested by Keynes (1936), when agents have heterogeneous expecta-
tions about asset’s future payoﬀs, the demand for this asset of each agent will
not only reﬂect his own expectations, but also his beliefs about other agents’
expectations. This can be formally shown in a simple asset pricing model.
Consider an overlapping generation economy where, at time t,an e wg e n -
eration of investors, indexed on the unit interval [0;1], enters the market.5
At the beginning of period t, each investor chooses a portfolio, which maxi-
mizes the expected utility of her future wealth (Wt+1). In the second period
(period t + 1), she sells this portfolio to the next generation of investors.6
Each investor can either invest in a risky asset or in a risk free bond. We
assume that investors have power utility U (Wt+1)=( W
1−γi
t+1 − 1)/(1 − γi),
5The choice of an overlapping generation model with short-lived agents is an important
characteristic of this model. This hypothesis has been made for two reasons: ﬁrstly, it
signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes the solution for the price equation, and secondly, as shown by Allen,
Morris and Shin (2003), the eﬀect of higher order beliefs on the price is bigger when in-
vestors have a short investment horizon. Thus, short-lived agents allow us highlighting the
eﬀects of higher order beliefs on the price. Note that this assumption ﬁnds its justiﬁcation
in Section 3 and does not have any implications for the results of this section.
6Two hypotheses are implicit in this model: 1) the investors live only two periods and
2) they consume only in the second period. Even though these hypotheses are clearly
restrictive, they are not implausible for an economy where markets are mainly driven by
traders who are regularly assessed on the basis of their portfolio wealth.
3where γi is the constant relative risk aversion of investor i.7 We also assume
that, at the end of period t, each investor is replaced by a new investor with
the same relative risk aversion. Finally, we assume that asset returns are
log normal.
The solution to the individual maximization problem described above is
(see e.g. Campbell and Viceira 2002, p. 29):
αi,t =
Ei
t [rt+1] − r
f
t+1 + 1
2σ2
i,rt+1
γiσ2
i,rt+1
(1)
where αi,t is the fraction of wealth that investor i puts into the risky
a s s e ta tt i m et, Ei
t [rt+1] is the log return of the risky asset on the next
period expected by investor i at time t, r
f
t+1 is the risk free log return on the
next period and σ2
i,rt+1 is the asset return volatility at time t + 1 expected
by investor i at time t. Note that this model allows for heterogeneous
expectations about return and volatility among investors.
Assuming that the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient, the expected return
and the expected volatility are jointly independent for each investor, the
aggregating of Equation (1) over all agents gives:
αt =
1
γ
µ
1
νt+1
¯ Et
h
rt+1 − r
f
t+1
i
+
1
2
¶
(2)
where ¯ Et =
R 1
0 Ei
tdi is the average expectation over all the investors, αt
is the average fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset, γ =
³R 1
0
1
γidi
´−1
is the inverse of the average of the inverse of the relative risk aversion coef-
ﬁcient and νt+1 =
µ
R 1
0
1
σ2
i,rt+1
di
¶−1
the inverse of the average of the inverse
of the asset return expected volatility. For simplicity, we will call γ the
average relative risk aversion and νt+1 the average expected asset return
volatility.
2.2 The equilibrium asset price
From Equation (2), it is possible to ﬁnd the average individual demand xD
t
for the risky asset. The equilibrium asset price pt follows from the market
7The advantages of using power utility rather than exponential utility or quadratic
utility are discussed by Cambpell and Viceira (2002), p. 24.
4clearing condition xD
t = xS
t ,w h e r exS
t is the average supply of share at
time t. We assume that the asset supply is random and cannot be observed
by the agents (i.e. xS
t is unknown to the agent), but its mean is public
knowledge and is standardized to be equal to 0.8 Given the market clearing
condition, we can recover the asset price by using the following ﬁrst order
Taylor approximation of the asset log return (see e.g. Campbell and Shiller
1988):
rt+1 =l o g
Pt+1 + Dt+1
Pt
= b + ρpt+1 +( 1− ρ)dt+1 − pt
where Pt is the asset price at the beginning of period t (and pt its loga-
rithm), Dt+1 is the dividend distributed at the end of period t (and dt+1 its
logarithm), and b and ρ are parameters. Using this approximation and the
market clearing condition yields:
pt = ¯ Et
h
ρpt+1 +( 1− ρ)dt+1 − r
f
t+1
i
−
µ
γαt −
1
2
¶
νt+1 + b + εt (3)
where εt is the eﬀect of the random supply shock on the price. The ﬁrst
part of the right hand side of Equation (3) tells us that the price is a function
of the average expected asset return. The second part can be understood
as a time-varying risk premium, which increases with the average expected
asset return volatility, the average fraction invested in the risky asset and
the average relative risk aversion.
As the price and the dividend are usually non stationary variables, we
can rewrite Equation (3) in terms of the price-to-dividend (P/D) ratio δt =
pt − dt:9
δt = ¯ Et [ρδt+1 + zt+1] − βtνt+1 + b + εt (4)
8The assumption of a random asset supply implies that there is an exogeneous shock
to the asset supply at time t, which is not observable for the agents. The origin of the
shock is not explicit in this model. Any trade, which is not motivated by a rational
investment decision by the agents can cause this shock (e.g. liquidity trading, additional
stock released by the ﬁrm or irrational trading).
9The P/D ratio is a stationary variable in the sample used for this paper (cf. Section
5.2)
5where zt+1 = ∆dt+1 − r
f
t+1 is the ”adjusted dividend growth rate” and
βt = γαt − 1
2. By solving this equation forward (and rulling out bubbles),
we get the ﬁnal equation:
δt =
∞ X
k=0
ρk ¯ Ek+1
t
£
zt+k+1 − βt+kνt+k+1
¤
+ c + εt (5)
where c = b
1−ρ and ¯ Ek
t [xt+k]= ¯ Et
£ ¯ Et+1
£
... ¯ Et+k [xt+k]
¤¤
is the average
expectation of order k of the variable xt+k, which is the average expectation
at time t of the average expectation at time t+1 of the average expectation at
time t+2, etc.. of the variable xt+k. Equation (5) is called the Heterogeneous
Expectation Asset Price Model (HEAPM).
Equation (5) is the formal counterpart of Keynes’ beauty contest metaphor.
Indeed, the investor i will have the following expectation for the future P/D
ratio:
Ei
t [δt+1]=
∞ X
k=0
ρkEi
t
h
¯ Ek+1
t+1
£
zt+k+2 − βt+k+1νt+k+2
¤i
+ c (6)
This equation shows that, in order to forecast the P/D ratio, investor i
will use her expectation of the average of the other agents’ expectations. In
particular, in this model, the investor must guess the average expectation of
the future adjusted dividend growth rate, of the future asset return volatility
and of the future fraction invested in the risky asset. Thus, forecasting the
price implies forecasting others’ forecasts. This shows that, on a market
with heterogeneous expectations, higher order beliefs do theoretically play
a role in the explanation of the price.
3 The HEAPM with private and public informa-
tion
Unfortunately, the validity of the HEAPM in Equation (5) cannot be checked
directly with empirical data. One way to ﬁnd a testable version of this
model is to impose further assumptions about the informational structure
of the economy (Biais and Bossaerts 1998). This paper adopts a structure
of information inspired by Allen, Morris and Shin (2003), which mixed a
6private heterogeneous signal and a public common signal (cf. Section 3.1).
Given this structure, it is possible to deduct agent i’s expectations and his
beliefs about others’ expectations (cf. Section 3.2) and thus, to compute an
equilibrium equation for the P/D ratio (cf. Section 3.3). Section 3.4 shows
that this P/D ratio is more volatile than with ﬁrst order expectations. As, in
equilibrium, the past P/D ratios contain some information about the future
adjusted dividend growth rate, the investor can use them as the public signal
(cf. Section 3.5). Our ﬁnal equilibrium equation will therefore be a mix of
heterogeneous non observable private signals about future adjusted dividend
growth and a public observable signal based on the past P/D ratios.
3.1 The information structure
Let us assume that each investor has two sources of information about the
future adjusted dividend growth rate zt+k: a public signal and a private sig-
nal. The public signal z∗
t+k is the best forecast of zt+k given by the past P/D
ratios available at time t.E x p r e s s e di nad i ﬀerent way: z∗
t+k = E [zt+k |Ωt],
where Ωt = {δt−1,δt−2,...} is the public information set. Note that the cur-
rent ratio δt is not included in the public information set. This corresponds
to a market with the following sequence of decisions: 1) the agents form
their expectations, 2) they place their orders on the market according to
their expectations and 3) the price Pt is set in order to clear the market.
Therefore, the agents have to form their expectation before knowing the
price Pt and, thus, before knowing δt.
In addition to the public forecast, each investor i observes an unbiased
private signal x
i
t+k on the future values of zt+k. This signal is based on his
private information set Θ
i
t only, which does not contains any public infor-
mation (Ωt ∩ Θ
i
t = ®). Thus the private signal is xi
t+k = E [zt+k |Θ
i
t].
We assume that the average signal over all the agent is unbiased, thus
R 1
0 xi
t+kdi = zt+k.W e ﬁnally assume that both signals are normally dis-
tributed and that the relative precision of the private signal to the public
signal λ is the same for each investor, for each forecast horizon and is con-
stant in time.10
10This last assumption will be relaxed in Section 7.
7To be complete, because the average fraction of wealth invested in the
asset (αt) is not known by the agents, we have to specify the information
about it available to each investors. We make the hypothesis that this
variable is equal to αt = α +  t,w h e r e t are i.i.d. and α is not directly
observable. Therefore, the expectation about αt is constant in time and is
the same for everyone, which implies in particular that βt+k = β.
3.2 Forecasting the others’ forecasts
Equation (5) can be split in two parts: ﬁrstly, the iterated average expecta-
tion of zt+k+1 and, secondly, the iterated average expectation of the average
variance νt+k+1. With the informational framework describes in the previ-
ous section, it is possible to compute a solution for these two terms. The
next two sections present the solution for the iterated average expectation
of adjusted dividend growth and for the iterated expectations of the average
variance, respectively.
3.2.1 Forecasting the iterated average expectation
Allen et al. (2003) have shown that the traditional law of iterated expec-
tations Et [Et+1 [...E t+k [zt+k]]] = Et [zt+k] does not hold for the iterated
average expectations with heterogeneous private information and a public
signal. However, when the weight given to each signal is constant, an alter-
native law of iterated average expectations exists. Allen, Morris and Shin’s
basic idea is the following: consider investor i,w h ot r i e s ,a tt i m et,t of o r e -
cast the adjusted dividend growth rate at time t+1 using the public signal
and her private signal. Her expectation will be a weighted average of the
two signals:
Ei
t [zt+1]=( 1− λ)z∗
t+1 + λxi
t+1 (7)
where λ is the relative weight given to the private signal. This rela-
tive weight reﬂects the relative precision that the agents associate to each
signal.11 No assumption is made on how the agents assess this relative pre-
11The relative precision is, by assumption, identical for every investors and constant in
time (cf. section 3.1). The latter assumption will be relaxed in Section 7. Note that the
8cision. They can, for example, give a subjective weight to each signal or use
their objective precision. Taking the average of Equation (7) over all agents
yields:
¯ Et [zt+1]=( 1− λ)z∗
t+1 + λzt+1
Now consider the case where the investor is still situated at time t, but
wants to forecast the average expectation at time t + 1 of the adjusted
dividend growth rate at time t+2. Using the previous result for the average
expectation of zt+2 and taking its expectation for investor i yields:
Ei
t
£ ¯ Et+1 [zt+2]
¤
=( 1− λ)z∗
t+2 + λEi
t [zt+2]
Plugging equation (7) for zt+2 into the previous equation gives:
Ei
t
£ ¯ Et+1 [zt+2]
¤
=
¡
1 − λ2¢
z∗
t+2 + λ2xi
t+2
More generally:
Ei
t
h
¯ Ek
t+1 [zt+k]
i
=
³
1 − λk
´
z∗
t+k + λkxi
t+k (8)
Thus, investor i’s expectation of the average expectation is a weighted
average of the public and the private signal where the weight of the public
signal increases with the forecast horizon. Equation (8) is equivalent to:
Ei
t
h
¯ Ek
t+1 [zt+k]
i
= z∗
t+k +λ
¡
xi
t+k − z∗
t+k
¢
−λ
³
1 − λk−1
´¡
xi
t+k − z∗
t+k
¢
(9)
The ﬁrst term of the sum in the right hand sight of Equation (9) is the
future adjusted dividend growth rate’s expectation given the public informa-
tion. Investor i adjusts this forecast with the second term of the sum to take
into account her private information. These ﬁrst two terms represent the
agent’s expectation about the future adjusted dividend growth rate given
the public and the private information. In addition, the investor makes a
last adjustment to her expectation since she tries to guess the average ex-
pectation of future adjusted dividend growth rate and not its true value.
precision of each signal can vary in time; only their relative precision is assumed to be
constant.
9Therefore, the last term of the sum in Equation (9) reﬂects the ”beauty
contest” eﬀect on investor i’s expectations. Note that the coeﬃcient of this
last term is negative, which implies that the weight of the public signal is
bigger in the ﬁnal expectation than it would be if the investor had to guess
the true future value of the dividend. This reﬂects the fact that each agent
knows that the other agents also observe the public signal and that every-
body uses it in their forecast. Therefore, as the public signal enters into
every individual expectations, it is a better predictor of the average opin-
ion than the private signal. Note also that the weight of the public signal
becomes bigger with the forecast horizon. This is due to the fact that with
a longer horizon, the number of average expectations’ layers is higher and
therefore, the resemblance between the average expectation and the best
forecast of the dividend decreases.
The aggregation of Equation (8) over all the agents yields:
¯ Ek
t [zt+k]=
³
1 − λk
´
z∗
t+k + λkzt+k (10)
3.2.2 Forecasting the variance
In the particular framework of Section 3.1, the problem of the iterated av-
erage expectation of the ”average variance” ( ¯ Ek+1
t [νt+k+1]) reduces to the
traditional iterated expectation solution. The intuition behind this result is
the following: since we assume that the precision of the signal distribution
is the same for everyone, then the expected variance of zt+k is also the same
for each investor. Then, if everyone has the same expected variance, its
average expectation is known to everybody and is equal to the traditional
iterated expectation.
More formally, the proof is the following: recall ﬁrst that σ2
i,rt+j is the
expected variance of rt+j for investor i at time t + j − 1. Using the same
ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation as in Section 2.1 yields:
σ2
i,rt+j = ρ2σ2
i,δt+j + σ2
i,zt+j (11)
T h ev a r i a n c eo fzt+j can be inferred from the variances of the two signals.
As, by assumption, both signals are normally distributed with the same
10variances for everybody, the inferred variance of zt+j is the same for each
agent.12 We therefore have:
σ2
i,rt+j = ρ2σ2
i,δt+j + σ2
zt+j
The last step is to compute the volatility of the P/D ratio expected by
each investor (σ2
i,δt+j). For this, we assume that each investor believes that
the P/D ratio volatility is a function of the future adjusted dividend growth
rate volatility. Under this assumption, the P/D ratio volatility is indeed a
function of the future adjusted dividend growth volatility,13 which makes the
investor’s ex-ante beliefs consistent with their ex-post observation. Finally,
if the P/D ratio volatility is a function of the adjusted dividend growth
volatility, then as the latest is the same for everybody, the former is also
identical for every investor. Thus:
νt+k+j = ρ2σ2
δt+k+j + σ2
zt+k+j (12)
and
¯ Ek+1
t [νt+k+j]=Et [νt+k+j]=ν∗
t+k+j (13)
3.3 HEAPM with public and private information
Plugging the result about the iterated average expectation of the adjust
dividend growth rate in Equation (10) and of the iterated expected return
volatility in Equation (13) into Equation (5) yields the P/D ratio equation:
δt =
∞ X
k=0
ρk
³³
1 − λk+1
´
z∗
t+k+1 + λk+1zt+k+1 − βν∗
t+k+1
´
+ c + εt (14)
Note that if the agents give all the weight to the private signal (λ =1 ) ,
the P/D ratio is a function of the discounted sum of future dividends. This
is equivalent to a model with perfect foresight. This result is due to the fact
that, if everybody follows her private signal only, the individual errors will
be cancelled out by the aggregation among investors.
12See e.g. Hogg and Craig (1995) p.149.
13See proof in Appendix A.
11Furthermore, as explained in Section 3.2.1, if the investors were trying
to guess the true value of the adjusted dividend growth and not the average
expectations, or in other words, if they were not taking into account the
beauty contest eﬀect, the price would be equal to:
δFOE
t =
∞ X
k=0
ρk ¡
(1 − λ)z∗
t+k+1 + λzt+k+1 − βν∗
t+k+1
¢
+ c + εt (15)
The ”pure” beauty contest eﬀect on the price can be isolated by sub-
tracting Equation (15) from Equation (14).
BCEt = λ
∞ X
k=0
ρk
³
1 − λk
´¡
z∗
t+k+1 − zt+k+1
¢
(16)
Note that the beauty contest eﬀect is equal to zero when λ =1a n dw h e n
λ = 0. This result is not surprising since in the ﬁrst case, each investor relies
on her private signal only and does not try to guess the average expectation
by using the public signal. In the second case, everybody uses the public
signal only, thus, everybody has the same expectation and we end up in the
traditional case of homogeneous rational expectation.
3.4 HEAPM as a possible solution to the volatility puzzle
One consequence of the HEAPM is that it induces a higher price volatility
than the traditional rational expectation model. To see that, let us ﬁrst
deﬁne the fundamental value PVt as:
PVt =
∞ X
k=0
ρkzt+k+1 − βν∗
t+k+1 − c
which is a measure similar to the net present value of the asset minus
the risk premium. Rewriting Equation (14) and (15) with this new variable
yields:
δt =( 1 − π)PV∗
t + πPVt + εt
δFOE
t =
¡
1 − πFOE¢
PV∗
t + πFOEPVt + εt
12where PV∗
t =
P∞
k=0 ρkz∗
t+k+1 − βν∗
t+k+1 − c is the best forecast of PVt
given the public information and π (πFOB) is the weight given to this forecast
in the model with higher order expectations (with ﬁrst order expectations,
respectively). We have λk
t <λ t for k>1 which implies that π<π FOB.I n
a general formulation, we have:
δt =( 1− a)PV∗
t + aPVt + εt (17)
Thus the best forecast that we can make about PVt using the price is:
Et [PVt]=
δt − (1 − a)PV∗
t
a
By deﬁnition, the best forecast given the price is the best public forecast
(PV∗
t = Et [PVt]), which implies PV∗
t = δt. Plugging this result into the
Equation (17) yields:
δt = PVt +
1
a
εt
Given the shock εt is exogenous, the variance of the P/D ratio is then:
Va r(δt)=Va r(PVt)+
1
a2Va r(εt)
Thus the smaller the coeﬃcient α, the higher the variance of the P/D
r a t i o . S i n c ew eh a v et h a tπ<π FOB, the variance of the P/D ratio with
higher order expectations is bigger than without. The fact that higher order
expectations induce putting more weight in the public signal exacerbates
the noise in this signal, making the price more volatile than with ﬁrst order
expectations. This could constitute a theoretical explanation to the excess
volatility puzzle.
3.5 How to extract the public signal from the price
Equation (14) is the fundamental equation of the HEAPM. It describes the
process that drives the P/D ratio. In particular, it shows that the P/D ratio
is a function of the public signal on the future adjusted dividend growth
rate z∗
t+k, its true future value zt+k and the public signal on the future asset
return volatility ν∗
t+k. But, if the P/D ratio is driven by Equation (14), then
its value partly reﬂects the true value of future adjusted dividend growth
rate (zt+k). Therefore, the P/D ratio contains some information about the
13future adjusted dividend growth rate. Since this information is available to
everybody, the P/D ratio can be used as public information. The next two
sections show how to extract the relevant public information from the P/D
ratio and how to infer the public signals z∗
t+k and ν∗
t+k from it.
3.5.1 Public signal on the adjusted dividend growth
Let us ﬁrst deﬁne the new variable yt as:
yt = δt −
∞ X
k=0
ρk
³³
1 − λk+1
´
z∗
t+k+1 − βν∗
t+k+1
´
− c
Note that at time t,t h ev a r i a b l eyt is known since it is constituted of the
current P/D ratio and the best forecasts of the adjusted dividend growth
rate and of the volatility of the asset return given the public information.
Equation (14) can be rewritten with this new variable:
yt = λ
∞ X
k=0
(ρλ)
k zt+k (18)
From this last equation, it can be deduced that:
zt+k =
1
λ
yt+k−1 − ρyt+k (19)
At time t, none of the variables in the last equation are know, but if is
possible to forecast them using the public information. This yields:
Et [zt+k |Ωt]=
1
λ
Et [yt+k−1 |Ωt] − ρEt [yt+k |Ωt] (20)
The left hand side of this equation is the expected adjusted dividend
growth rate given the public information, which precisely corresponds to
the deﬁnition of the variable z∗
t+k.14 After replacing yt by its deﬁnition, it
is possible to solve the equation for the variable z∗
t+k.T h i sy i e l d s :
z∗
t+k = δ∗
t+k−1 − ρδ∗
t+k + βν∗
t+k + b (21)
where δ∗
t+k = Et [δt+k |Ωt] is the best forecast of the P/D ratio at time
t + k, given the public information available at time t and ν∗
t+k is the best
14See Section 3.1.
14forecast of the asset volatility at time t + k, given the public information
available at time t.
3.5.2 Public signal on the asset return volatility
Similarly to the public signal on the adjusted dividend growth rate, it is
possible to compute the best forecast of the asset return volatility given the
public information (ν∗
t+k). To do so, we combine Equation (12) and (13):
ν∗
t+k = Et [νt+k]=ρ2Et
h
σ2
δt+k
i
+ Et
h
σ2
zt+k
i
(22)
We have that σ2
zt+k = Va r t+k−1 [zt+k]. Using Equation (19) again yields:
Va r t+k−1 [zt+k]=ρ2Va r t+k−1 [yt+k]
Combining the previous equation, Equation (18) and Equation (25)15
gives:
Va r t+k−1 [zt+k]=ρ2σ2
δt+k
Taking the expectation at time t reduces it to:
Et
h
σ2
zt+k
i
= Va r t [zt+k]=ρ2Va r t [δt+k]
Finally, by plugging this last equation into Equation (22), we get:
ν∗
t+k =2 ρ2Va r t [δt+k] (23)
4 How to test the model
If the HEAPM model is right, then the P/D ratio should follow Equation
(14). One way to test the validity of the HEAPM is to compute the the-
oretical P/D ratio given by Equation (14) and then compare it with the
empirical dynamic observed on the market (cf. Section 4.2). In order to use
Equation (14), we ﬁrst have to estimate the empirical value of the public
signals z∗
t+j and ν∗
t+j, which are necessary to compute the theoretical P/D
ratio.
15See Appendix A.
154.1 Estimation of the public signals
As Equation (23) shows, estimating the public signal ν∗
t+k is equivalent to
forecasting the future volatility of the P/D ratio given the public information
available at time t (which is constituted of the past P/D ratios). For the
public signal z∗
t+k, Equation (21) tell us that we have to forecasts the future
value of P/D ratio given the information available at time t. It is possible
forecasts the P/D ratio and its volatility given its past values by using
an autoregressive equation of order p with conditional heteroskedasticity of
order q (AR(p)-ARCH(q) model). Then, using this estimated model, it is
possible to compute the best public forecast for δt+j and νt+j. Concretely,
the AR(p)-ARCH(q)m o d e lt a k e st h ef o l l o w i n gf o r m :
δt = ϑ + φ1δt−1 + ...+ φpδt−p + ut
u2
t = ζ + α1u2
t−1 + ...+ αqu2
t−q + wt
where ut and wt are white noises. This system can be rewritten in vectors
and matrix terms to facilitate the forecasts.16 It takes the following form:
δt = ϑ + φδt−1 + ut
u2
t = ζ + αu2
t−1 + wt
Given this process, we can compute the best forecasts, which are equal
to:
δ∗
t+i = φi+1δt−1 +
¡
1 − φi+1¢
(1 − φ)
−1 ϑ
u2∗
t+i = αi+1u2
t−1 +
¡
1 − αi+1¢
(1 − α)
−1 ζ
Thus, once the parameters of the AR(p)-ARCH(q) model estimated, it
is possible to compute the z∗
t+k’s and the ν∗
t+k’s in Equation (14) given the
past information by using the best forecasts given above and Equation (21)
and (23). The theoretical P/D ratio is then equal to:
16See Hamilton (1994), p. 7, to see how to rewrite a nth-order diﬀerence equation in
vector and matrix terms.
16δt = Ψδt−1 − Γu2
t−1 + λ
∞ X
k=0
(ρλ)
k zt+k+1 + C (24)
where:
Ψ = gpφ
³
Ip − λ(Ip − ρφ)(Ip − ρλφ)
−1
´
Γ =2 λβρ2gqα2 (Iq − ρλα)
−1
where C is a constant, Ip,q are identity matrices of dimension (p × p)a n d
(q × q), respectively, and gp,q are p and q raw vectors, respectively, with all
element equal to zero except for the ﬁrst one, which is equal to one. These
vectors select the ﬁrst row or the ﬁrst element of the next matrix or vector,
respectively.
4.2 Indirect tests of the model
Unfortunately, Equation (24) cannot be directly tested since the future ad-
justed dividend growth rate is not known. However, it is possible to get an
approximation of the theoretical P/D ratio by using the adjusted dividend
growth rates observed ex-post.17 Then, one can get an idea of the validity
of the model by examining the importance of the diﬀerences between the
theoretical P/D ratio, which corresponds to the price-to-dividend ratio that
would prevail if the model given by Equation (24) was true, and the observed
P/D ratio. One way to do that concretely is to test if the variance of the
theoretical P/D ratio is equal to the variance of the observed P/D ratio.
5 Data and parameters
5.1 Data set
The HEAPM is estimated with annual data on American stocks’ prices, div-
idends and interest rates for the period between 1871 and 2003. The prices
17We made the assumption that the adjusted dividend growth rates after 2003 are equal
to their historical mean. The eﬀect of this assumption should be marginal for the major
part of the sample since the mean of dividend diﬀerence is close to zero and is discounted.
However, it might aﬀect more signiﬁcantly the last observations.
17and dividends are taken from the Standard & Poors 500 Composite Stock
Price Index, extended back to 1871 by using the data in Cowles (1939).18
The interest rate is the 6-month prime commercial paper rate.
5.2 Preliminary veriﬁcations
Before going estimating the model, we checked that the variables are sta-
tionary. Table 1 displays the t-statistics of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
test for the null hypothesis of unit root.
Table 1: Unit root test
1871-1995 1871-2003
δt -4.2466*** -2.8340*
zt -10.0796*** -10.3925***
The test shows that the hypothesis of unit root is rejected at a 1%
conﬁdence level for the adjusted dividend growth rate on the entire period.
For the P/D ratio, the hypothesis of unit root is rejected at a 1% conﬁdence
level for the period 1871-1995. If we introduce the next eight years, this
hypothesis is rejected at a conﬁdence level slightly higher than 5%. Formally,
the P/D ratio can be considered as stationary at a 6% conﬁdence level, but
this ﬁrst test suggests that the behavior of the market might have change
during the period 1996-2003.
5.3 Estimation of the parameters
Finally, before estimating the theoretical P/D ratio given by Equation (24),
we must estimate the diﬀerent parameters of the model. The parameters
ρ and b are taken from the estimation of equation: log(Pt+1 + Dt+1)=
b + ρpt+1 +( 1− ρ)dt+1 + ηt where is a ηt white noise. The vectors of
18The index reﬂects the total market value of all 500 component stocks at a given
date. The market value of a company is determined by multiplying the stock by
the number of common shares outstanding. The dividends can be recovered from
an index, which is based on the sum of the total monthly dividend for the same
500 stocks. This data set is kindly provided by Rober J. Schiller on his website
(http://www.econ.yale.edu/˜shiller/data.htm).
18parameters φ and α come from the estimation of the AR(p)-ARCH(q)m o d e l
presented in Section 4.1. Finally, the parameter β can be estimated by using
Equation (21). To do so, we use the hypothesis made in Section 3.1, which
states that the public signal is an unbiased signal of the future adjusted
dividend growth rate. Therefore, the parameter β can be estimated by the
following regression:
zt = δ∗
t−1 − ρδ∗
t + βν∗
t + b + υt
where E [υt] = 0. The best forecasts δ∗
t−1, δ∗
t and ν∗
t can be replaced by
their value derived from the AR(p)-ARCH(q) model as described in Section
4 . 1t og e tt h eﬁnal regression equation for the parameter β:
zt = gp (Ip − ρφ)δt−1 +2 βρ2gqαu2
t−1 + b + εt
Table 2 gives the estimated parameters for an AR(3)-ARCH(1) model
estimated on the entire sample.
Table 2: Estimated parameters
Parameter Test value
b 0.1664
ρ 0.9613
ϑ 0.3542
φ1 0.8477
φ2 -0.0689
φ3 0.1160
ζ 0.0208
α1 0.5652
β 4.0643
196 Model with constant relative weight: empirical
results
6.1 Overall sample vs. rolling sample estimation
Once that the parameters of the model are known, it is possible to compute
the theoretical P/D ratio for any given relative weight λ by using Equation
( 2 4 ) . I ti st h e np o s s i b l et oe s t i m a t et h er e l a t i v ew e i g h tλ∗ for which the
theoretical price is the closest to the price observed on the market. To ﬁnd
this optimal relative weight, we computed the sum of the squared diﬀerences
between the observed and the theoretical P/D ratio given λ.W et h e nd e ﬁne
the optimal λ∗ a st h er e l a t i v ew e i g h tw h i c hm i n i m i z et h es u mo ft h es q u a r e d
diﬀerences.
Two methods are possible to estimate the parameters of the model and
the optimal weight. Firstly, one can estimate the parameters of Equation
(24) by using the observations of the entire sample (”overall sample estima-
tion”) and then compute the theoretical P/D ratio for each period. This
is equivalent to the situation where investors in 1920, for example, use the
same parameter as investors in 2000. This can be the case if investors do
not infer the model parameters from the past observations but use some
constant rule to set the value of these parameters. The second method is
to estimate the parameters of the model for each period, using only the
available information at this time, and then compute the theoretical P/D
ratio given the parameter at this time (”rolling sample estimation”). This
estimation method corresponds to the case where, at each period, investors
use the new information to re-evaluate the model parameters and make their
forecast with these new values. The results of both methods are compared
in the next section.
6.2 Estimated relative weight and volatility tests
The optimal relative weight λ∗ is equal to 0.227 with the overall sample
method and to 0.187 with the rolling sample method. These two results are
relatively similar. They mean that, between 1871 and 2003, the investors
seem to have given a weight to the public information about four times big-
20Figure 1: Theoretical P/D ratio with constant relative weight (overall sam-
ple method)
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ger than the one given to the private information. Figure 1 and 2 show the
observed and the theoretical P/D ratio with the overall sample method and
the rolling sample method respectively.19 With both methods, the theoret-
ical price follows relatively closely the price observed on the market. This
is particularly true for the overall sample method. In both case, the picture
is very diﬀerent from the traditional graph given by a rational expectation
model where the theoretical and the observed price diverge signiﬁcantly (see,
e.g., Shiller 1981 or 2003).
19With the rolling sample method, the theoretical P/D ratio is computed from 1900.
The observation before this date are used to give the ﬁrst estimation of the parameters.
21Figure 2: Theoretical P/D ratio with constant relative weight (rolling sample
method)
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The volatility tests conﬁrm these conclusions. Table 3 displays the test
statistics and the p-values of the volatility test for the optimal value of λ
with both methods. The null hypothesis is the equality between the two
variances. For the overall sample method, the tests indicate that it is not
possible to reject the hypothesis of equal variances at a 5% conﬁdence level.
For the rolling sample method, the equal variance hypothesis is rejected
at a 5% conﬁdence level for all tests but is accepted at a 1% conﬁdence
level. Note that, with the rolling sample method, the volatility of the model
(σ2 =0 .2749) is bigger than the observed one (σ2 =0 .1693). The evidence
in favour of the model with higher order beliefs are not unquestionable,
22Table 3: Volatility test
Method Overall sample Rolling sample
Test value p-value Test value p-value
F-test 1.374090 0.0745 1.623560 0.0146
Siegel-Tukey 1.477986 0.1394 2.224521 0.0261
Bartlett 3.180563 0.0745 5.960385 0.0146
Levene 2.051350 0.1533 4.681654 0.0316
Brown-Forsythe 1.938616 0.1650 3.889712 0.0499
but formally, both models pass the volatility test at a 1% conﬁdence level.
Therefore, a model with higher order beliefs seems to give a volatility which
is in line with the one observed on the market, what traditional rational
expectation models fail to do.
6.3 Stability of the relative weight
In our HEAPM, the relative weight λ is assumed to be constant in time.
This is a rather strong hypothesis. To check if this hypothesis corresponds
to the reality, we computed the optimal relative weight over diﬀerent periods
of 20 years. The result for the entire sample and the rolling sample method
are displayed in Figure 3. In these two ﬁgures, it is clear that the relative
weight seems to vary with time. The next section deals with this problem
by slightly modifying the original HEAPM and introducing a time-varying
relative weight.
7 Model with time-varying relative weight: em-
pirical results
7.1 Modiﬁcation of the original model
With a time-varying relative weight, the original HEAPM of Equation (14)
can be re-written as:
23Figure 3: Stability of relative weight (L: overall. R: Rolling)
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δt =
∞ X
k=0
ρk
³³
1 − λk+1
t
´
z∗
t+k+1 + λk+1
t zt+k+1 − βν∗
t+k+1
´
+ c1
This model implies that, at each time t,i n v e s t o r sc h o o s ead i ﬀerent
relative weight between the private and the public signal. This relative
weight varies for each period, but at time t, it remains constant for each
forecast horizon t+k. It is still assumed that the relative weight is identical
for each investor. Similarly to the constant relative weight, the optimal
λ∗
t, which is diﬀerent for each period, is deﬁned as the relative weight that
minimizes the squared diﬀerence between the theoretical and the observed
δt at time t.
7.2 Estimated relative weight and volatility tests
The estimated relative weights obtained with the overall sample and the
rolling sample method are presented in Figure 4. As suggested by in the
previous section, the optimal relative weight seems to vary signiﬁcantly in
time. Note that with both methods, the periods with a relative weight equal
to zero, which corresponds to a situation where investors give no weight to
their private signal, are relatively rare and short. The end of the 90s is an
exception since both methods indicates that investors have used only the
24Figure 4: Estimated relative weight (L: overall. R: rolling)
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public signal for several years in a row. This could explain the irregularities
in the stationary of the P/D ratio mentioned in Section 5.2.
Figures 5 and 6 (in Appendix B) show the observed and the theoretical
P/D ratios with a time-varying relative weight. Once again, the P/D ratios
given by the model are relatively close to the observed ones. This conclusion
is conﬁrmed by the p-values of the volatility tests presented in Table 4. With
a time-varying relative weight, the hypothesis of equal variance between the
observed and the theoretical P/D ratio cannot be rejected at a 5% conﬁdence
level.20 This is a signiﬁcant empirical evidence in favour of the HEAPM
developed in this paper. It seems that a model with higher order beliefs
is able to generate a volatility, which is similar to the one observed on the
market, whereas rational expectation models fail to produce this feature.
8 Conclusion
This paper proposes an asset pricing model, which takes into account in-
vestors’ higher order beliefs. The particularity of this model is that it can
be estimated and thus help to determine if the eﬀect of higher order beliefs
on the stock price is empirically signiﬁcant. The model is estimated with
20The hypothesis cannot even be rejected at a 10% conﬁdence level, if we do not take
into account the Siegel-Tukey test.
25Table 4: Volatility test
p-value
Method Overall sample Rolling sample
F-test 0.9988 0.1205
Siegel-Tukey 0.6959 0.0503
Bartlett 0.9988 0.1205
Levene 0.7879 0.1385
Brown-Forsythe 0.8269 0.1497
American data on stock prices, dividends, and interest rates for the period
between 1871 and 2003. The main conclusion is that higher order beliefs
seem to have a signiﬁcant impact on asset prices. In particular, the price
volatility induced by the model does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from the volatil-
ity observed on the market. In this sense, higher order beliefs appear to be
a plausible explanation of the excess volatility puzzle.
In addition to the main conclusion, the paper sheds light on a few other
points. First, it shows that heterogeneous expectations induce the beauty
contest phenomenon described by Keynes (1936). In the asset price equa-
tion, the beauty contest eﬀect takes the form of an iterated average expec-
tation. This iterated average expectation replaces the iterated expectation
used in traditional asset price models. Second, after making some further as-
sumptions about the information available to each agent, we give a testable
asset price equation. This equation is a useful tool to understand how the
agents combine their private and public information to take into account
the beauty contest eﬀect. In particular, it shows that, in order to guess
others’ expectations, the agent put more weight on the public signal than
they would do if they were trying to guess the future dividends. They do so
because, as the public signal inﬂuences everyone’s expectation, it constitutes
a better predictor of the average opinion that the private signal.21 Finally,
in our model, the price still contain some information about the future pay-
oﬀs. This paper shows how this information can be extracted from the past
prices. The direct consequence of this is that the past prices can be used as
21This result has been highlighted by Morris and Shin (2002).
26the pubic signal described above.
In conclusion, our empirical results indicate that higher order beliefs
might play a signiﬁcant role in the stock markets. A signiﬁcant part of the
volatility observed in the price seems to be explained by this phenomenon,
rather than by the movements of the fundamentals. This conclusion suggests
that adding higher order beliefs to traditional present value model could im-
prove their empirical performance. The model used in this paper is based on
some restrictive hypotheses, but its simplicity and its preliminary empirical
results might constitute a promising basis for further developments.
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30A Volatility of the P/D ratio
From Equation (14), we can compute the volatility of δt+j expected by
investor i at time t + j − 1. This yields:
Va r i
t+j−1 (δt+j)=Va r i
t+j−1
Ã
∞ X
k=0
ρk
³³
1 − λk+1
´
z∗
t+j+k+1 + λk+1zt+j+k+1 − βν∗
t+j+k+1
´!
As the expected adjusted dividend growth z∗
t+j+k and the expected
volatility ν∗
t+j+k are known at time t + j − 1, their conditional variance
is null and the previous equation is equivalent to:
Va r i
t+j−1 (δt+j)=Va r i
t+j−1
Ã
∞ X
k=0
ρkλk+1zt+j+k+1
!
Thus, the variance of the P/D ratio is a function of the variance and
autocovariance of the future adjusted dividend growth. As we have seen
in Section 3.2.2, these variances and autocovariances are identical for each
investor and therefore we have:
Va r i
t+j−1 (δt+j)=λ2Va r t+j−1
Ã
∞ X
k=0
(ρλ)
k zt+j+k+1
!
= σ2
δt+j (25)
31B Theoretical and observed P/D ratios with time
varying relative weight
Figure 5: Theoretical P/D ratio with time-varying relative weight (overall
sample method)
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32Figure 6: Theoretical P/D ratio with time-varying relative weight (rolling
sample method)
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